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PARTNERSHIP-THE UNIFORM ACT
AND THE FLORIDA LAW
CHARIM V. SILLIMAN
Our federal system, with its great diversity of state laws, has been
a source of much confusion to the layman, who while migrating from
state to state with ever-increasing frequency has been made aware,
frequently in a way shocking to him, of the confusing changes in his
legal rights and duties whenever he crosses state lines. How the majority of our states have eliminated much of this confusion in relation
to partnership law, and how Florida would benefit by following their
example, constitute the basis of this article.
HISTORICAL APPRAISAL OF THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP

Aar

The desirability of eliminating some of the confusion and conflicts
inherent in our federal system, together with the promotion of uniformity of state legislation, was given serious consideration as early
as August, 1892, when the first Conference of Commissioners for the
Promotion of Uniform Legislation was held at Saratoga, New York,
with representatives from seven states. From that time conferences
have been held annually; and since 1912 all the states, the District
of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands
have been officially represented. The various uniform acts have received a total of more than a thousand adoptions in the participating
jurisdictions, and have unquestionably influenced legislation in many
other instances in which the form of the uniform act was not followed. Section 11.01 of Florida Statutes 1951, first enacted in 1895,
provides for Florida's participation in the drafting of uniform laws.'
1"The governor shall appoint, by and with the consent of the senate, three
commissioners by the name and style of commissioners for the promotion of uniformity of legislation in the United States. The said board shall examine the
subject of marriage and divorce, insolvency, form of notarial certificates, descent
and distribution of property, acknowledgment of deeds, execution and probate of
wills, and other subjects; ascertain the best means to effect assimilation and uniformity in the laws of the state, and to co-operate and advise with similar commissions appointed for a like purpose in other states of the union; and, if wise
and practicable, draft uniform laws to be submitted for the approval and adoption
of the several states, and devise and recommend such other course of action as

[2811
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The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws began work on a uniform law of partnership fifty years ago.
James Barr Ames, Dean of Harvard Law School, undertook in 1902 to
prepare a first draft of a Uniform Partnership Act; and at his death
in 1909 the project had reached a second tentative draft. William
Draper Lewis, Dean of the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania, completed the work. Although both draftsmen drew on the
English Partnership Act of 18902 for guidance, their divergence in
approach produced some of the theoretical conflicts that boiled up in
academic circles when the UPA was first adopted. Ames apparently
hoped to reform our existing partnership law and to procure the acceptance of the concept of the partnership as a legal entity. His influence is seen most strongly in the provisions permitting the partnership as an entity to acquire and convey realty - an entirely new but
nonetheless desirable concept in our law. Lewis, on the other hand,
considered the purpose of the UPA to be a codification and unification of existing partnership law, and his influence predominated in a
major portion. Though neither man had his way, the blending of
their concepts may have in the long run produced something better
than either could have produced if he had had a free hand; and undoubtedly this compromise has influenced the wide acceptance of the
UPA.
In 1914, after spending many years in preparing and discussing
various drafts, the Conference adopted the final draft, which the
American Bar Association approved and recommended for adoption
by the legislatures of the several states. Since that time the UPA has
been adopted in thirty-one states and Alaska, although Florida rexnains in the ever-diminishing minority. That the UPA has conclusively withstood the hard test of long usage and has unquestionably
proved its worth is established by the rather large number of states
that, overcoming the pull of long-standing inertia, have adopted it
since 1940, over a quarter of a century after acceptance of the final
draft by the Conference.
While a majority of the hundred or more uniform acts drafted
and approved by the Conference from time to time have subsequently
shall best accomplish the purposes of this section. Said commissioners shall serve
for four years and without compensation."
253 & 54 Vic'r., c. 39.
31941-Arkansas, North Carolina, Vermont; 1943-Nebraska; 1945-Washington;
1947-Montana, New Mexico, Delaware; 1949-California, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio;
1950-South Carolina.
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been withdrawn, declared obsolete, superseded, or redesigned as model
acts 4 the enthusiastic adoption of the UPA by so many state legislatures such a long time after its initial promulgation should convince
the Florida Legislature that the UPA has, in its field, established
itself as a desirable piece of legislation and has achieved in fact substantial uniformity in a large and important area of American jurisprudence.
"ENnTY" AND "AGGREGATE" CONCEPTS OF THE PARTNERSHIP
This article does not propose to fight again the theoretical battles
that raged among learned scholars of another day. 5 The flames of
legal controversy have somewhat died down, but legal purists may
still be found who will shed an occasional tear at the way in which
Dean Lewis rode roughshod over Dean Ames' original draft of the
UPA. That draft was designed to present to the world a concept of
the partnership as a legal entity, a concept that was generally followed
in the civil law and that was probably accepted by the English courts
when the law merchant first became known in England. The common
law courts gradually broke it down to such an extent, however, that
equity frequently was called upon to help the cause of justice and
restore as far as possible the "entity" concept in partnership relations.
When Lord Mansfield became Chief Justice in 1756 he ably utilized his civil law training to bring about in England a recognition
of the civil law principles embodied in the law merchant, his purpose
being to bring the English law into some measure of uniformity with
the law of continental Europe as far as commercial matters were concerned. Despite his success in some areas, however,6 he was not able
to secure common law recognition of the partnership as an entity,
even though from the time of the Roman law onward this concept
was basic in the law merchant throughout Continental Europe. There
4The model act category consists of proposed statutory skeletons on which each
jurisdiction is to hang its own flesh in enacting its statute; uniformity is considered undesirable or impracticable.
5See, e.g., Crane, The Uniform PartnershipAct, A Criticism, 28 Hv. L. Riw.
762 (1915); Lewis, The Uniform PartnershipAct-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism,
29 HAv. L. Rav. 158, 291 (1916).
GNotably in the fields of sales, insurance, and negotiable instruments. One of
Mansfield's important partnership cases was Fox v. Hanbury, 2 Cowp. 446, 98 Eng.
Rep. 1179 (1776), dealing with relative rights of partners and of partnership and
separate creditors in partnership property.
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remained, therefore, both in English law and in the law of our states
through their adoption of this English law, the curious and confusing
paradox of treatment of a partnership by the common law courts as
an "aggregate" no different from any other unincorporated association, with the partnership contract and partnership property regarded
as mere joint contracts and joint property, while the equity courts,
through their early recognition of the partnership aspects of the law
merchant, tended to treat partnerships for most purposes as an "entity" with an existence separate from that of the partners. The resulting confusion and uncertainty created many demands for reformation by statute. England in 1890 adopted its partnership act,7 and

a number of our states enacted partnership acts of a sort. 8 Not until
the appearance of the UPA, however, did any codification of partnership law approaching the scope of the English act appear in the
United States.
MERITS OF THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACr

From the point of view of pure legal theory it must be admitted
that the UPA is something short of a masterpiece. The same may be
said, however, of the Constitution of the United States and a fortiori
of the Constitution of Florida. These instruments do, however, have
several points in common. They all represent an attempt to reconcile
conflicting theories of law; they have each resulted from compromise
and concession; they have each stood the test of time in
their respective fields without an abnormal amount of legislative and
judicial mutilation; and, most important, they have satisfactorily performed the job they were created to do and have played an important
role in our judicial system as workable and useful instruments of
law.
The criticisms sometimes leveled at the UPA go back in large part
to a fundamental error shared not only by some of the most learned
scholars of the law but also by the most enlightened of laymen, namely, that the partnership is a simple thing. The truth is, however, that
no relationship in the entire field of law, with the possible exception
of that of husband and wife, is more uncertain and complex, or is
753 & 54 VICT., c. 39.

SCompare the California Code provisions, for example, with the UPA. See
Wright, California Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act, 9 CALIF.
L. REv. 117, 206, 306, 391 (1921).
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subject to so many conflicting theories of law, or cuts across so many
fields of law. Indeed the potential ramifications of many a simple
oral agreement, which the contracting parties often do not even recognize as a partnership, dwarf by their magnitude the problems presented by the worst holding company nightmare of Samuel Insull.
Our corporation structure is a tangible thing, and can be pinned
down by the precise statutes and other instruments creating it. But no
specific law creates the partnership, and there are no definite rules
preventing its formation or precisely circumscribing its operation. It
is a fluid thing that may be created by a thousand-page written document or by a handshake. Unlike a corporation it has no fixed situs.
Its operations cannot be stopped by state lines. It follows each of its
members to the ends of the earth and may simultaneously transact
business in a dozen states or countries on a foundation no more tangible than a gentlemen's agreement. In fact, no real, workable definition of a partnership exists. One can find associations in which
the members are partners as to third persons and yet not partners as
to each other, or persons that are partners as to each other for some
purposes but not partners for other purposes.9 The UPA does not,
of course, solve all the problems of the complex enigma known as
the partnership. The only limits to the endless variations of the
partnership structure are the almost boundless limits of man's imagination, the more articulate but rarely discovered bounds of public
policy as set out by the courts or by specific legislation, such as those
relating to partnerships for an illegal purpose,-0 and, of course, the
limitations on a partnership with an enemy alien in wartime. 11 The
very scope of the area through which partnerships may roam is alone
enough to demonstrate that no code of law, no matter how carefully
9Notable are the problems of family partnerships for tax purposes as personified
in the confusing muddle of the Culbertson, Tower, and Lusthaus cases: Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280
(1946); Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 327 U.S.

293 (1946).
loNotably the famous Everet v. Williams, known as The Highwayman's Case
and referred to in L.R. 20 Eq. 230 n. (circa 1725), in which an accounting was denied as to the proceeds of a partnership of robbers. This is perhaps the most
drastic instance of judicial dissolution of a partnership, since the court not only
denied an accounting but summarily terminated the partnership by having its
members hanged.
I"Rodriguez v. Speyer Bros., [1919] A.C. 59 (1918); Continental Tyre Co. v.

Daimler Co., [1916] 2A.C. 307; see 37 HIA'v. L. Rxv. 773 (1924).
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contrived, can be expected to supply attorneys with the final answers
to all partnership problems.
The important thing about the UPA, therefore, is not that it is
the final perfected answer to the lawyer's or layman's problems, but
rather that it is looked upon by the majority of American jurisdictions as a lantern shedding much light in what is otherwise a broad
expanse of darkness and confusion. It focuses its rays on the major
areas within which the partnership may function; and it delineates
these areas far more sharply than could the statutes or case law of any
single state. It supplies simple and easily understood answers to many
of the questions that oui: courts have not as yet had occasion to answer
and that are presently quagmires of doubt and confusion to our most
learned attorneys. It greatly clarifies those issues centering on ownership of partnership property and on the comparative rights of creditors, whether of the partnership or of the individual partners. It
minimizes the confusion attending termination of a partnership not
circumscribed by a specific agreement. It clarifies the questions concerning the power of a partner to bind the partnership and to bind
his partners individually. It provides specifically for many other contingencies not dealt with by existing law.
Despite these several merits the UPA does not impose any appreciable limit on the versatility of the partnership form of organization, since there is scarcely a provision in it that the partners cannot
nullify by specific agreement to the contrary, once their attention is
called to the problem squarely. 12 Indeed, one of the greatest achievements of the UPA is that it provides an intelligible and practicable
framework for the partnership whenever the partners themselves have
inadvertently failed to do so. This feature is doubly important because even the carefully drafted partnership agreement rarely anticipates all of the possible situations, and further because many partnerships in Florida and elsewhere have no written agreement at all and
not infrequently exist when the members thereof are completely unaware of the fact that they are partners in the eyes of the law.
To attempt even to touch upon all of the complexities of partnership law as it moves across every other field of law is beyond the
scope of this article; our purpose is rather to survey briefly the cur12This flexibility stands in strong contrast to the rather rigid restrictions on
limited partnerships imposed by the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, FLA.
STAT. c. 620 (1951).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1952

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1952], Art. 3
UPA AND FLORIDA LAW
rent Florida law on partnerships, 13 as well as the UPA provisions
for aspects of partnership law not yet dealt with by Florida, and to
consider the fundamental changes that will be effected in our law by
14
adoption of the UPA.
DISTINCrIONS AMONG THE PARTNESmHP AND RELATED ASSOCIATIONS

Unquestionably the most difficult problem in dealing with the
partnership is to state precisely what it is. In this regard neither the
law of Florida nor the Uniform Partnership Act is of much help, although the various tests set out by the UPA are far more nearly certain, and therefore easier to apply, than the vague criteria scattered
through the Florida decisions.
Before entering upon the details of definition, however, it is advisable to clear up some of the confusion obtaining among the partnership, the limited partnership, the joint enterprise or joint adventure, the Massachusetts Trust or business trust, and the joint stock
company.
Limited Partnership
The limited partnership is a form of association unknown to the
common law. It possesses some of the attributes of a partnership and
some of the attributes of a corporation. Like a corporation, and unlike the true partnership, it cannot exist unless the legislature has
specifically provided for it by law. Such a provision appeared in Florida with the enactment in 1943 of the Uniform Limited Partnership
15
Law.
The limited partnership, like a corporation, requires a formal
written instrument for its creation, the minimum contents of which
are specifically set forth in the statute. This instrument, which must
be filed with the secretary of state, is analogous to the charter of the
corporation. The limited partnership must have a precise name, and
this name must contain the word "limited." Two types of partners
23Since the limited partnership is a purely statutory concept, no attempt is
made herein to consider it in any detail. See note 12 supra.
'-There is no question in the writer's mind but that our Legislature will
adopt the UPA when the lawyers of this state overcome their present inertia on
this score.
15F". STAT. c. 620 (1951).
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are required: the general partner, whose rights and liabilities are
similar to those of a general partner in any partnership, and the
limited partner, who is not permitted to manage the partnership or
take part in its operations, whose contribution to the business is confined to supplying capital, and who, unlike the general partner, may
limit his liability to the extent of the capital that he has invested in
the partnership.
This statutory creature is almost as far removed from the true
common law partnership as is the corporation, and its very existence
depends upon full compliance in all respects with the statutory provisions. The permission of the state, not the mere agreement of the
partners, creates the limited partnership, 16 although on several occasions the Florida Supreme Court has used language indicating that
even in the absence of statutory authority a limited partnership can
17
be created by mere agreement of the partners.
It is readily apparent that the adoption of the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act had no more effect in solving the basic problems of
our ordinary partnership law than would the adoption of a new corporation statute, since the two types of associations, though referred
to as partnerships, are entirely different.

' 6 See Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 24 N.E.2d 732 (1939), which demonstrates
authoritatively that at common law, although ordinary partners as between themselves may limit their liability, such limitations relate to their personal accounting
only, and do not limit the rights of partnership creditors as a true limited partnership does. This factor perhaps explains the confusion in some of the Florida
opinions.
1E.g., Singletary v. Mann, 157 Fla. 37, 39, 24 So.2d 718, 719 (1946): "So the
indication is that there was a limited partnership between Singletary and Mann
in regard to cattle from 1932 until March, 1939, at which time the partnership arrangements ceased to exist and Mann from thenceforth was agent, servant and
employee of Singletary." Precisely what the Court means by "limited partnership"
here is anyone's guess, unless it was merely lapsing into loose language. Since
there was no limited partnership act in Florida during the time referred to by
the Court, this association obviously could not have been a true limited partnership; such an association cannot exist any more than a corporation can exist in
the absence of legislative enactment; see note 16 supra. In Sweat v. Boyd, 126 Fla.
180, 170 So. 740 (1936), Buford, J., who also wrote the decision in the Singletary
case, made the following statement: "It is well settled that a limited partnership
may be formed for the prosecution of a single transaction." What the Court had
in mind here, however, was manifestly not a limited partnership but rather a
"joint enterprise" or "joint adventure."
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Joint Adventure
The distinction between what is called a joint adventure or joint
enterprise and a partnership is rather nebulous. The courts sometimes refer to an association having all the attributes of a partnership,
but involving a corporation as one of its members, as a joint enterprise. This judicial subterfuge is frequently employed to answer the
oft-made objection that a corporation cannot be a member of a partnership and that accordingly any attempt to join one is ultra vires.
The courts thereupon, instead of voiding the agreement on the partnership theory, sustain it as a joint adventure. This disability of the
corporation is based on the basic statutory limitation of those having
power to bind it. Inasmuch as each member of the normal partnership has the power to bind the other members, the ban on corporate
entry into a partnership rests on the bounds set by corporation law
rather than on limitations of partnership.
Several states now by statute permit a corporation to become a
member of a partnership; and the UPA makes room for any such
statutory change by defining a partnership s as "an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit" and
defining persons 9 as "individuals, partnerships, corporations, and
other associations." Of course, merely adopting the UPA without
changing the corporation law so as to allow a corporation to enter into
a partnership agreement would not in itself enable the corporation
to become a partner; the corporation would still be faced with the
limitation that it can act through its duly constituted officers only.
Legislative alteration of our corporation law is preferable to burdening the courts with the hopeless task of attempting to solve the frequent corporation-partnership squabbles that arise whenever a corporation attempts to join forces with a partnership.
Moreover, as regards the current status of Florida law, it should
be pointed out that legal limitations on the objectives and manner
of functioning of a corporation, including the issue, of who can bind
it, should logically apply in every instance in which the corporation
is part of what is in fact a partnership association, regardless of the
name that the bench chooses to give to the association. Use of the
term "joint enterprise" may serve as a verbal escape, but the judiciary
has as yet failed to face the real problem involved. The only legiti'BUPA §6.
'ld. §2.
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mate meaning of this term is an association that has all the attributes
of a partnership except that it is created to engage in a single limited
transaction; and this is the sense in which the Florida Supreme Court employs the term. Indeed, the Court has indicated that
there is no real difference between a partnership and a joint adven-

ture.

20

Massachusetts Trust and Joint Stock Company
It is clear that the true Massachusetts Trust is in fact a trust and
not a partnership, although some states have imposed partnership liability on its beneficiaries as a result of either judicial ignorance or
public policy - or possibly a combination of the two. Florida, after
an apparently false start in Willey v. W. J. Hoggson Corp.,21 finally
saw the light and in Walker v. Close22 recognized a business trust for
what it is.
On the other hand, the joint stock company has always been recognized as a partnership, which it undoubtedly is, although some jurisdictions have held that the shareholders, who are in reality partners,
may limit their liability as regards those persons who contract with
the company manager with full knowledge of his lack of authority to
bind them in an amount exceeding their investment. The Florida
Legislature passed a peculiar statute in 1947, however, relating to
foreign unincorporated associations;2 3 and this enactment apparently
20A. J. Richey Corp. v. Garvey, 132 Fla. 602, 607, 182 So. 216, 219 (1938) (per
Terrell, J.), "We think therefore that Richey, Becker, and Garvey were co-partners
or joint adventurers .. ."; Willis v. Fowler, 102 Fla. 35, 50, 136 So. 358, 365 (1931),
"A joint adventure is very similar to a partnership, the chief distinction being
that where a partnership is ordinarily formed for the transaction of a general
business of a particular kind, a joint adventure is usually, but not necessarily,
limited to a single transaction, though the business of conducting it to a successful
termination may continue for a considerable period of time"; Proctor v. Hearne,
100 Fla. 1180, 1187, 131 So. 173 (1930), "The relation of joint adventurers is
quite similar to that of partnership, and is governed by the principles which
constitute and control the law of partnership."
2190 Fla. 343, 106 So. 408 (1925)
(business trust apparently regarded as partnership).
2298 Fla. 1103, 125 So. 521 (1929). See also FLA. STAT. c. 609 (1951), providing
fo " filing of trust instrument and issuance of business certificate.
23FLA. STAT. §622.01 (1951): "Qualification in compliance with this chapter is
not and shall not be mandatory, and is and shall be optional, as a permissive
alternative to compliance with any other law or laws with respect to the trade,
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gives them "entity" status. Little can be said as yet concerning this
statute other than it is certain to cause our judiciary some headaches
in the future.
The UPA does not specifically mention joint stock companies or
business trusts. Massachusetts has held 24 that the provisions permitting a partner to dissolve a partnership even though its term has not
business or fictitious name or style, and the recording, registration or publication
thereof, under which business may be transacted by an unincorporated association, company or group of persons; but no foreign association, as defined hereinafter, shall enjoy or exercise the powers conferred by this chapter unless it shall
have qualified in compliance herewith." §622.02 (1) continues: "The term 'Foreign
association' as used in this chapter shall mean and include any unincorporated
joint stock association for profit, created and existing under the laws of any state
other than this state . . . engaged in any business or businesses other than the
banking, trust or insurance business, and having written articles of association,
capital stock divided into shares, and a name including the word 'company' or
'association' or 'society' . . . . ... Since a joint stock company is a partnership and
is created by agreement of the shareholders rather than by "the laws of any state,"
the precise meaning of this definition is far from clear.
§622.02 (2) defines "association" to ".

.

. include any foreign association that

shall have qualified, in the manner permitted by this chapter, to transact business
and acquire, hold and dispose of property and sue and be sued in this state."
§622.03 provides: "Any foreign association may qualify to transact business and
acquire, hold and dispose of property and sue and be sued in this state, by complying with all requirements of law . . . now or hereafter prescribed for qualification by foreign corporations for profit to transact business in this state . . .
except that in lieu of filing an authenticated copy of any charter ... the foreign
association shall file a duly authenticated copy of its written articles of association."
Since a joint stock company, like the partnership regularly so named, is created
by a simple contract, by whom is such a contract, or "written articles of association," to be authenticated? Furthermore, since our law, which is the basic common law, does not permit any partnership to buy and sell realty in the partnership name, even though a conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name is
not void, as it is in many jurisdictions, but is "a latent ambiguity, that may be
explained and supplied by parol," LaFayette Land Co. v. Caswell, 59 Fla. 544,
52 So. 140 (1910), does this statute attempt to change the common law rule in
this regard and permit a partnership to buy and sell land in the partnership
name? Note that the UPA changes the common law rule in this respect. Again,
does the foregoing section mean that a foreign joint stock company, complying
with this chapter-if indeed it possibly car comply with this chapter-may nevertheless sue and be sued as a legal entity even though it is in fact a partnership?
If so, who can enforce a judgment in its favor; and how may a judgment against
it be enforced? The writer would greatly appreciate any hint that the draftsmen
of this chapter can give as to what their purpose was and how they expected it
to be effectuated in practice.
24State Street Trust Co. v. Hall, 311 Mass. 299, 41 N.E.2d 30 (1942).
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expired do not apply to a business trust, the reason being, of course,
that the business trust is not a partnership and therefore is not affected
by the 1922 Massachusetts statute adopting the UPA.25 Furthermore,
since the UPA may be altered by specific agreement among the partners as regards most of its provisions, it probably does not preclude
the existence of joint stock companies. Just how the Florida statute
referred to in the preceding paragraph26 would modify a Florida
adoption of the UPA in relation to a foreign joint stock company,
however, is anybody's guess.
FLORIDA CRITERIA OF THE PARTNERSHIP

Since the formation of a partnership requires no specific formality
and indeed may result from a mere oral agreement, 27 some readily
applied tests are needed to assist the courts and the members of an association in determining whether they are in fact partners.

The

Florida test is "the intent of the parties." 28 This so-called test is of
little value, however, since it merely substitutes an equally difficult

issue, namely, the selection of those factors that determine the intent
of the parties. It is clear that the name given by the members of an
association to it or to each other does not of itself fix its character at
law. In Webster v. Clark the Court quoted Judge Cooley with approval:

29

"It is... possible for parties to intend no partnership and yet
form one. If they agree upon an arrangement which is a partnership in fact, it is of no importance that they call it something
else, or that they even expressly declare that they are not to
be partners. The law must declare what is the legal import of
their agreements, and names go for nothing when the substance
of the arrangement shows them to be inapplicable."
Indeed, persons intending to be stockholders in a defective corpora-

25MASS. LAws ANN. C.
26

See note

23

108A, §§1-44 (1946).

supra.

27Nahmod v. Nelson, 147
28Uhrig v. Redding, 150
Garbey, 132 Fla. 602, 182 So.
2934 Fla. 637, 649, 16 So.

Fla.
Fla.
216
601,

564, 3 So.2d 162 (1941).
480, 8 So.2d 4 (1942); A. J. Richey Corp. v.
(1938).
604 (1894).
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tion were held liable as partners in Duke v. Taylor,30 although in
the normal sense of the word these persons obviously did not "intend"
to be partners. The need for some dear test is apparent.
For a long time at common law the sharing of profits was the supreme test of partnership status;31 but in Cox v. Hickman,32 a leading
English case, it was stripped of its conclusive character. The Supreme
33
Court of Florida, in Dubos v. Jones, observed:
".... the law at one time in England, and in some of the American courts, treated such sharing of profits as the true test that
established a partnership; particularly so as to third persons,
. .but this doctrine has become entirely obsolete, and is no
longer law either in England or in this country. ...The law is
now well-settled that where a person loans or advances money
or goods to another to be invested in some business or enterprise, the lender to share in the profits as or in lieu of interest
on, or in repayment of such loan or advance, does not [sic]
constitute a partnership; neither will it constitute a partnership as to third persons unless the acts of the parties in furtherance of the agreement between themselves amount to such a
holding of themselves out as partners as that third persons are
misled into a reasonable belief that a partnership exists in fact."
*

Having abandoned the old test of sharing the profits, the Florida
Court has offered no substitute except "the intent of the parties,"
which as a test is at best too vague to be of any practical value.
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Aar CRITEIA oF TH

PARTNERSHIP

The UPA has met the problem of defining the partnership by
designating the sharing of profits, with certain specified exceptions,
34
as prima facie evidence that a person is a partner:
"The receipt by a person of a share of the profit of a busi3037 Fla. 64, 19 So. 172 (1896); accord, Winfield v. Truitt, 71 Fla. 38, 70 So. 775

(1916).
-lThis view was strongly championed by dictum in Waugh v. Carver, 2 Bl.
H. 235, 126 Eng. Rep. 525 (1793).
32L.R. 8 H..268, 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (1860).
3334 Fla. 539, 552, 16 So. 392, 396 (1894).

34UPA §7 (4).
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ness is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business,
but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment: (a) As a debt by installments or otherwise,
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord, (c) As an
annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner,
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary
with the profits of the business, (e) As the consideration for the
sale of a good-will of a business or other property by installments or otherwise."
While no single test of a partnership can be established, the value
of some practical yardstick that can be applied definitively is selfevident. To utilize the sharing of profits as at least prima facie evidence of a partnership, as does the UPA, is a major improvement upon
the vague "intent" test seized upon by Florida. Admittedly the UPA
does not give us the final answer, but it does provide us with at least
a starting point in our law where now there is none. The UPA does
not purport to alter the substantive law of partnerships; rather, it
marks a beginning from which any association under examination
may be tested. In this respect it performs a valuable service.
EFFECr OF THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT ON EXISTING FLORIDA
PARTNERSHIP RELATIONS

Section 4 (5) of the UPA provides:
"This act shall not be construed so as to impair the obligations of any contract existing when the act goes into effect,
nor to affect any action or proceedings begun or right accrued
before this act takes effect."
It is clear that the UPA does not alter the essential contractual
nature of the partnership; indeed, most of its prescriptions can be
altered by specific agreement of the partners. 35 Nevertheless various
35See, e.g., UPA §8(2), "Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired with partnership funds is partnership property"; §8 (4), "A conveyance to
a partnership

in

the partnership

name, though without words of inheritance,

passes the entire estate of the grantor unless a contrary intent appears"; §9(2),
"An act of a partner which is not apparently for the carrying on of the business
of the partnership in the usual way does not bind the partnership unless authorized by the other partners"; §18, "The rights and duties of the partners in relation
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novel provisions, such as those covering real estate conversion, dissolution, winding up, charging order, and the application of assets
to the payment of debts, have already been construed in some jurisdictions to apply to partnerships existing at the effective date of the
UPA.36
SCOPE OF THE PARTNERSHIP AND AUTHORITY OF THE PARTNERS

The essential element of the partnership that distinguishes it from
other types of associations is the agency relationship that usually exists. Within the framework of the partnership or within the scope
of its business each partner is normally the agent of all the other partners and of the partnership, and he has the power to bind them by
his acts. The UPA in no way changes the common law in this regard and merely codifies the common law principles in a readily
7
workable form:3
"Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, including the
execution in the partnership name of any instrumentt 3 ] for
apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the
partnership of which he is a member binds a partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority
to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the
person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that
he has no such authority. (2) An act of a partner which is not
to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them,
by the following rules .... "
3
6E.g., Wharf v. Wharf, 306 Ill. 79, 137 N.E. 446 (1922)

(change in Illinois
law brought about by UPA treatment of all real property of partnership as converted into personal property "out and out," rather than merely as needed for
payment of partnership debts, held applicable to property acquired by partnership prior to enactment of UPA in Illinois), 10 CORNELL L.Q. 72 (1924); Froess v.
Froess, 284 Pa. 369, 131 At. 276 (1925) (provisions of UPA relating to dissolution
held applicable to partnership formed before Pennsylvania passage of UPA);
Crossman v. Gibney, 164 Wis. 395, 160 N.W. 172 (1916) (applying same principle
in Wisconsin).
37UPA §9 (1).
3sAvoiding the common law requirement that authority of an agent to execute
a written instrument had to be granted by an instrument of equal formality, ix.,
authority to execute a written instrument had to be granted by a written instrument, and to execute an instrument under seal by a sealed instrument.
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apparently for the carrying on of the business of the partnership in the usual way does not bind the partnership unless
authorized by the other partners. (3) Unless authorized by the
other partners or unless they have abandoned the business, one
or more but less than all the partners have no authority to:
(a) Assign the partnership property in trust for creditors or on
the assignee's promise to pay the debts of the partnership,
(b) Dispose of the good will of the business, (c) Do any other
act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary
business of the partnership, (d) Confess a judgment, (e) Submit
a partnership claim or liability to arbitration or reference. (4)
No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on authority shall bind the partnership to persons having knowledge of
the restriction."
Section 10 of the UPA deals with the special provisions in relation to conveyance of partnership realty.3 9 Section 11 sets up a rule
of evidence generally accepted at common law:
"An admission or representation made by any partner concerning partnership affairs within the scope of his authority
as conferred by this act is evidence against the partnership."
Section 13 creates partnership tort liability:
"Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner
acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is
caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership,
or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor
to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act."
A peculiar type of situation, in which an association not in fact
a partnership may nevertheless be such at law as to third persons,
exists under the so-called partnership by estoppel. The UPA clarifies
in large measure the common law confusion as to when a partnership
40
by estoppel arises:
"(1) When a person, by words spoken or written or by con39Discussed infra under the heading Nature of Partnership Property.
40UPA §16.
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duct, represents himself, or consents to another representing
him to any one, as a partner in an existing partnership or with
one or more persons not actual partners, he is liable to any such
person to whom such representation has been made, who has,
on the faith of such representation, given credit to the actual or
apparent partnership, and if he has made such representation or
consented to its being made in a public manner he is liable
to such person, whether the representation has or has not
been made or communicated to such person so giving credit
by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner making the
representation or consenting to its being made.
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as
though he were an actual member of the partnership.
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly
with the other persons, if any, so consenting to the contract
or representation as to incur liability, otherwise separately.
"(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a partner in an existing partnership, or with one or more persons
not actual partners, he is an agent of the persons consenting
to such representation to bind them to the same extent and in
the same manner as though he were a partner in
fact, with respect to persons who rely upon the representation.
Where all the members of the existing partnership consent to
the representation, a partnership act or obligation results; but
in all other cases it is the joint act or obligation of the person
acting and the persons consenting to the representation."
With respect to the tort liability of partners under Florida law
the UPA would make no change. Section 15 (a) provides that such
liability is joint and several, as it is at common law. Partnership
contract liability under the UPA is joint only as it is at common law. 1
The only change governs the liability of the partnership for the
misapplication by any partner of money or property of a third person
in its custody; 42 the partners are jointly and severally liable for such
misapplication. 43 This result apparently follows under the UPA regardless of whether the action is in form a contract action or a tort
action.
41UPA §15 (b).
42UPA §14.
43UPA §15 (a).
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COMPARISON OF FLORIDA AND UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP

Acr

BASES OF

PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY

One of the most troublesome problems at common law was the
fact that persons dealing with a partnership, especially when it did
business under its partnership name, tended to regard it as an entity.
This was in fact its status under civil law and undoubtedly represents
the way partners generally feel about their association even today.
In some aspects of the partnership, especially in relation to the ownership of property, a tacit recognition of the entity concept has crept
into our law, especially on the equity side.
The concept of partnership liability in the Florida decisions is
essentially the common law "aggregate" theory, which regards a contract of the partnership not as that of an entity but rather as the
agreement of the two or more individuals constituting the partnership and therefore a joint obligation. By the same token a tort of
the partnership is not that of an entity but the tort of the partners.
Since, however, joint tort-feasors have long been held jointly and
severally liable under our law, the tort liability of partners is joint
and several.
The UPA does not attempt to make any change in this concept,
and those changes that have been made have come about through
legislation quite apart from the UPA. For example, some states have
by statute undertaken to make all partnership contracts joint and
several - a desirable result, in the opinion of this writer, in view of
the fact that it greatly simplifies the task of the partnership creditor
in suing on partnership contracts.
Florida in attempting to solve this problem has by statute set up
two methods of service on partnerships. The first is Section 47.15 of
Florida Statutes 1951, which was originally enacted in 1828 and relates to service on a partnership generally. 44 This statute has been regarded by the Florida Supreme Court as going far toward recognition
of the partnership as an entity; in fact, in Johnston v. Albritton45
Mr. Justice Terrell indicated that by virtue of this statute " ... in this
state, the common law rule as to several persons composing a mercan44"When any original process is sued out against several persons composing a
mercantile or other firm, the service of said process on any one member of said
firm shall be as valid as if served upon each individual member thereof; and
the plaintiff may, after service upon any one member as aforesaid, proceed to
judgment and execution against them all."
45101 Fla. 1285, 1289, 134 So. 563, 565 (1931).
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tile or other firm has been abrogated.. . ." Does this mean that the
partnership is an entity as far as Florida is concerned? The statute,
read literally, indicates this. In attempting to enforce a judgment
against a partnership under this statute, however, the entity theory
is followed to the extent of partnership property only; and while such
a judgment is enforceable against the personal property of those partners who have in fact been personally served, as well as against the
interest of all the partners in the partnership property, it nevertheless
cannot be enforced against the personal property of partners not per4
sonally served in the proceedings. 6
Thus a partnership creditor in Florida suing on a partnership
contract and unable to secure personal service on all of the partners
is placed in a dilemma. Once he brings an action against the partnership and gets a judgment the matter is res judicata, yet he has
a judgment that can be enforced against only partnership property
and the individual property of those partners personally served. If
these assets are insufficient to satisfy the judgment, he can neither
execute on the personal property of the other partners nor bring a
new action against them on the contract. The sole solution to this
dilemma is to make all partnership contracts joint and several by
statute; but the UPA does not so provide and special legislation would
be required.
Section 47.16 of Florida Statutes 1951, providing for service of
process upon nonresidents engaging in business in this state, is subject to a number of serious objections in so far as partnerships are
concerned.' 7 This statute can probably be sustained as applied to
4oSpeight v. Home, 101 Fla. 109, 183 So. 574 (1931); Florida Brewing Co. v.
Sendoya, 73 Fla. 660, 74 So. 799 (1917).
47As amended by Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26657, §1, it reads: "The acceptance by
any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any
other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country,
and all foreign corporations, and any person who is a resident of the State of
Florida and who subsequently becomes a nonresident of this state or conceals
his whereabouts, of the privilege extended by law to nonresidents and others
to operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture, in the
State of Florida, or to have an office or agency in the State of Florida, shall be
deemed equivalent to an appointment by such persons and foreign corporations
of the secretary of state of the State of Florida as the agent of such persons or
foreign corporations upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action,
suit or proceeding against them, or either of them, arising out of any transaction
or operation connected with or incidental to such business or business venture,
and the acceptance of such privilege shall be signification of the agreement of
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foreign corporations, since Florida does in fact extend a privilege to
them by permitting them to engage in business here; but Florida does
not accord this privilege to partnerships of nonresidents to an extent
beyond that already guaranteed them by the Constitution of the
United States. Accordingly the application of this statute to partnerships is open to two objections: (1)the basis on which it purports
to grant jurisdiction is nonexistent; 4s and (2) it still leaves unanswered
the problem of enforcing a judgment obtained after such service.
Nevertheless, even this statute is not so objectionable as the one it
replaced, which was open to still further attacks on constitutional
grounds.
NATURE OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY

The historical development of partnership law has a strong bearing on the peculiar inconsistency of our law in its treatment of partnership personalty and partnership realty. The first partnerships receiving recognition in England were mercantile partnerships. They consisted of traveling merchants from all countries, who gathered periodically at the various fairs or staples to trade with each other and with
the people of the surrounding countryside. The early, rude courts set
up to dispense justice in disputes arising among these merchants recognized the two forms of partnership well known in Continental Europe,
the societas, corresponding to our general partnership, and the com-

menda or societe en commandite, corresponding to our limited partnership; and accordingly they took cognizance of the law merchant,
which treated these associations as entities. Because of the feudal
nature of land tenure at this time 49 the early partnerships did not deal
in land but confined their trading strictly to personal property. The
result was that the entity concept in relation to partnership personalty
such persons and foreign corporations that any such process against them or
either of them, which is so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as
if served personally on such persons or foreign corporations. Service of such
process shall be in accordance with and in the same manner as now provided for
services of process upon nonresidents under the provision of §47.30, Florida Statutes.
Provided that if a foreign corporation has a resident agent in the State of Florida,
service of process shall be had upon such resident agent as now provided by
statute."

4SAs contrasted with FLA. STAT. §47.29 (1951), providing for service of process
upon nonresident motor vehicle owners.
49The first statute giving legal sanction to the early mercantile courts was the
Statute of the Staple, 1353, 27 EDw. III, Stat. 2.
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became so well fixed in our law that partnership ownership of personalty is today an accepted fact.
On the other hand, in relation to realty a different doctrine arose.
Our feudal notions of real property required it to belong to a person,
or at least to a legal entity; and since the partnership was not a legal
entity it could not hold title to realty. This disability created some
serious problems when partnerships began, as a business matter, to
acquire real property. The partnership, in order to get around the
restriction on its holding legal title to realty, had to take title in the
name of one or more of the partners as individuals or on occasion
in the name of some third person not even a member of the partnership.
The equity courts very early came to the rescue of the partnership by imposing a trust on realty for its benefit, regardless of the
legal title, whenever some partner or other legal owner of partnership realty failed to use it for partnership purposes. This method of
dealing with partnership realty was cumbersome, however; it laid
the partnership open to possible loss in the event of fraudulent sale
to a bona fide purchaser by the person having the legal title; and it
raised considerable difficulty in connection with winding up partnership affairs upon the death of one of the partners. Thus, while the
surviving partner had the authority to sell partnership realty, he
frequently was forced to undergo the considerable expense of taking
action in court to compel the heirs of a deceased partner to join in
the conveyance for the purpose of conveying a valid legal title. Unfortunately Florida is floundering in this legal morass even today.
The UPA has completely changed the obsolete common law concepts of partnership realty. The partnership is as free to take legal
tide to real property as it is to take title to personalty, and such title
may be taken in the partnership name.50 Whenever title is so taken
any one of the partners has the power to convey good title to the
partnership realty.51 These provisions give much greater flexibility
to partnerships in dealing with real property; and in Florida, where
partnerships handling realty are so common, adoption of this straightforward approach would be especially beneficial. It should be added
that the UPA, however, still permits the partners to take title to realty
5oUPA §8(3).
5.UPA §10. He must, of course, as provided in §9, be apparently carrying on
the business of the partnership in the usual way, and the party with whom he
deals must be unaware of any lack of authority as regards the matter at hand.
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in the name of all of them whenever they desire to do so; and of
course all of them must in such event join in the conveyance in order
to convey a valid legal title.
The UPA further prescribes: "A partner's right in partnership
property is not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows,
heirs, or next of kin." 52 Since there is also a provision that upon
the death of a partner his right in specific partnership property vests
in the surviving partner or partners,53 the problem of disposing of
partnership realty in winding up the partnership after the death of
one of the partners is greatly simplified.
In addition, the UPA clarifies and offers solutions for a number
of other problems relating to partnership property. For example, at
common law and under Florida law, as it now stands, a judgment
creditor on a personal debt of a partner can execute against the entire partnership, and, although he may sell only the indebted partner's
interest in the partnership, such a sale requires a partnership accounting and brings about dissolution.54 In order to meet this unfortunate
situation the UPA has set up an entirely new technique, known as the
"charging order," which not only protects the creditor of the individual partner but also shields the other partners from untimely dissolution of the partnership: 55
"(1) On due application to a competent court by any judgment creditor of a partner, the court which entered the judgment, order, or decree, or any other court, may charge the interest of the debtor partner with payment of the unsatisfied
amount of such judgment debt with interest thereon; and may
then or later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits, and
of any other money due or to fall due to him in respect of the
partnership, and make all other orders, directions, accounts and
inquiries which the debtor partner might have made, or which
the circumstances of the case may require.
"(2) The interest charged may be redeemed at any time
before foreclosure, or in case of a sale being directed by the
court may be purchased without thereby causing a dissolution:
52UPA §25 (e).
53UPA §25 (d).
4
5 FLA. STAT. §55.20 (1951), B. A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 308, 14 So.2d 669
(1943).

55UPA §28.
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(a) With separate property, by any one or more of the partners, or
(b) With partnership property, by any one or more of the
partners with the consent of all the partners whose interests
are not so charged or sold.
"(3) Nothing in this act shall be held to deprive a partner
of his right, if any, under the exemption laws, as regards his
interest in partnership."
This charging order technique, which would bring about a complete change in Florida law, has a distinct advantage for both the
creditor and the partners. In the first place, a judgment creditor attempting to sell by execution merely the interest of a partner in a
partnership is in effect selling a pig in a poke. Regardless of what
a final accounting might disclose such interest to be, no one but a
born gambler would pay very much for such an uncertain speculation. In addition, the sudden forced dissolution of the partnership
frequently wipes out the principal value of the partnership, which is
the intangible power of a going concern. The charging order provided by the UPA keeps the partnership going, while protecting the
creditor of the individual partner. That this procedure would in the
long run be an advantage to all concerned is quite obvious.
Another disadvantage of the partnership frequently encountered
at common law was the rule that a partner could not dispose of his
interest in the partnership in any way without bringing about dissolution. If a partner pledged his interest in the partnership or otherwise disposed of it, even to his partner, the partnership came to an
end and the partnership creditors frequently lost their priority in
partnership assets. In Schleicher v. Walker,56 for example, the Supreme Court of Florida held that an assignment by one partner to
another of his interest in the partnership automatically dissolved the
partnership and deprived the partnership creditors of their preferred
claims to what had previously been partnership property.
The UPA is kinder in this regard, both to partners and to partnership creditors, than was the common law. It prevents a partner
from assigning his interest in specific partnership property, thus protecting the partnership. At the same time, however, he can assign
his interest in the partnership, for example, as security for a personal
loan, without thereby automatically dissolving the partnership. Fur5628 Fla. 680, 10 So. 33 (1891).
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thermore, a conveyance by one partner to another of his interest in
the partnership does not automatically deprive partnership creditors
of their preference in relation to partnership property; and this feature is obviously of great value not only to partnership creditors but
also to the partnership itself, inasmuch as its credit standing is improved substantially in the long run. If, however, the other partners
are opposed to conveyance of one partner's interest, the UPA permits
5
them to dissolve the partnership. 7
The common law conceived of a partnership as a specific group of
specific individuals, and any change in the personnel of the partnership, whether by withdrawal or addition of a partner, automatically
dissolved the partnership. The UPA, on the other hand, permits the
partnership to continue, even with a change in membership, and does
away with the uncertainty at common law regarding the ability of
old partnership creditors to reach old partnership assets in the possession of the new partnership. 51'
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has been merely to touch on some of
the high points of the UPA and to indicate a few of the ways in which
it would be of service to Florida. A number of somewhat less confusing areas of partnership law, such as dissolution of the partnership
and distribution of its assets, are dealt with specifically in the UPA
but are inappropriate for discussion in a critical summary such as
this. Those interested will find detailed analyses in the standard
treatises on partnership law. 59
Regardless of questions of legal theory, the principal value of
adoption of the UPA by Florida would be to fill in the many large
gaps now causing confusion and uncertainty in our partnership law.
In addition, such a move would set up a workable pattern of law,
comparable to our corporation and limited partnership statutes, for
the important and complex but much neglected form of business organization known as the ordinary partnership. The attorney could
advise his clients with much less hesitation and legitimate doubt about
57UPA §31 (1) (c).

-8See UPA §§17, 41, as well as Commissioners' Notes thereon at 7 UNIFORM
LAWs ANN. 100-101, 229-232 (1949).
59E.g., CRANE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1952); 7 UNIFORM LAws ANN. (1949) and current pocket supplement thereto.
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various phases of their partnership business than he can today.
Finally, our judiciary would benefit greatly through being able to
utilize the vast body of decisions in those other jurisdictions, now
a majority, that have already adopted the UPA.
Admittedly the UPA is not a final answer to every problem of
partnership law, but like the fabulous lance of Alvarado s0 it should
enable us to make a prodigious leap over our worst obstacles.

6OPedro de Alvarado (1495-1541) was the lieutenant of Cortes in his conquest
of Mexico. During the disastrous battle at Tenochtitlan, in which the Aztecs
wiped out three quarters of the Spanish army, Alvarado found himself cut off
by a horde of Aztecs at the edge of a large lake. Ever the precipitous man, he
plunged his lance into the bottom of the lake and pole-vaulted in full armor to
the other side. At least this is the story told by his companions, except for the
skeptic Bernal Diaz del Castillo, who after viewing the spot of the alleged leap
said it was impossible in his 2 TRUE HisroRy op THE CONQUEST OF NEW SPAIN 247
(Maudslay's transl. 1910). Bancroft, however, in I CONQUEST OF MExrco 480 (1883),
believes the story, on authority; and Mexicans of more recent times have had
enough faith in it to name a street in Mexico City, running along the supposed
site of the fabulous leap, in honor of the event.
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